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LECTURE
THAT "S" WORD: SOVEREIGNTY, AND
GLOBALIZATION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
ET CETERA*
Louis Henkin'
In an academic lecture it is the subtitle that counts. After you get
past "That 'S' Word," I offer the principal themes, globalization and
human rights, and that mysterious "et cetera," in which I will pack a
few tidbits.
I don't like the "S word." Its birth is illegitimate, and it has not
aged well. The meaning of "sovereignty" is confused and its uses are
various, some of them unworthy, some even destructive of human
values.
Not all of the uses are unworthy. During the past half-century,
many cheered the yearning for sovereignty by peoples that did not
have it: sovereignty was the watchcry for the principle of selfdetermination' and for the end of empires-the British, the French,
the Soviet. Some also cheered the disintegration of other once-

* Professor Louis Henkin delivered this address at Fordham University School
of Law on February 23, 1999, as part of the Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture
Series. The Editorial Board of the Fordham Law Review has added citations for the
convenience of the reader.
** LL.B., Harvard, 1940; L.H.D., Yeshiva, 1963; LLD., Columbia, 1995. Louis
Henkin is University Professor Emeritus and Special Service Professor at Columbia
University. Professor Henkin is also Chair of the Center for the Study of Human
Rights at Columbia, and Director of Columbia Law School's Human Rights Institute.
He is widely recognized as a leading authority on international law, the law of United
States foreign relations, United States constitutional law, and international and
comparative human rights. He served with the Department of State from 1948 to
1956 in the United Nations Bureau and the Office of NATO Affairs. Professor
Henkin represented the United States on the committee drafting the Refugee
Convention and on delegations to the United Nations and international conferences.
He was the president of the American Society of International Law from 1992 to 1994
and served on the Advisory Panel on International Law for the United States
Department of State from 1967 to 1969, 1975 to 1980, and 1993 to the present.
Professor Henkin was the co-editor-in-chief of the American Journalof International
Law from 1976 to 1984, and chief reporter of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States.
1. See Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the
Post-ColonialAge,32 Stan. J. Int'l L. 255,262 (1996).
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sovereign countries, such as the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.2
I will not talk about that. I address the sovereignty of states. It is
part of my thesis that the sovereignty of states in international
relations is essentially a mistake, an illegitimate offspring.
Sovereignty began as a domestic term in a domestic context. It
referred to relations between rulers and those they ruled, between the
"Sovereign" and his or her subjects. Its application to modern
states-a state is not a person, but an abstraction-and its relation to
other abstractions, such as the governments which represent states,
has inevitably brought distortion and confusion.
When Queen Elizabeth I was sovereign to her British subjects, she
carried her majesty, her sovereignty and her sovereign perquisites
with her when she dealt with other kings and queens. But what did
her sovereignty have to do with the insistence of governments today,
say of Iraq, that they cannot be held answerable for violating human
rights within their own territory? Or with Augusto Pinochet's claim to
some kind of sovereign immunity from being tried for horrible crimes
against humanity?3 Why does the sovereignty of Queen Elizabeth I
render the world helpless to deter, prevent, or judge genocide, or to
establish an international criminal court to bring to justice those
whom "sovereign" states cannot, will not, or do not bring to justice?
What has state sovereignty meant in our expiring century? In
simpler days, state sovereignty implied several key elements.
Primarily, it meant political independence.4 It also meant territorial
integrity5 and virtually exclusive control and jurisdiction within that
territory. 6
By extension, we also developed the concept of
nationality,7 perhaps harking back to the days when sovereignty
involved a Sovereign and a Subject. We sometimes refer to state
2. See generally Urs W. Saxer, The Transformationof the Soviet Union: From a
Socialist Federation to a Commonwealth of Independent States, 14 Loy. L.A. Int'l &
Comp. L.J. 581 (1992) (analyzing the dissolution of the Soviet Union); John F. Burns,
Confirming Split, Last 2 Republics Proclaim a Small New Yugoslavia, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 28, 1992, at Al (reporting the formal separation of former republics from
Yugoslavia); Chuck Sudetic, Yugoslav Groups Reach an Accord, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19,
1992, at A9 (reporting moves toward an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina).
3. See Tim Golden, Pinochet in the Dock; Arresting a DictatorIs One Thing.
Then It Gets Tough, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1998, § 4, at 5.
4. See Anthony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries:Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-CenturyInternationalLaw, 40 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1, 67 (1999); Celia R. Taylor,
A Modest Proposal:Statehood and Sovereignty in a Global Age, 18 U. Pa. J. Int'l
Econ. L. 745, 757-58 (1997); cf U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting members

from infringing upon the "territorial integrity or political independence" of any state).
5. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Taylor, supra note 4, at 757-59.
6. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History
of Jurisdiction),97 Mich. L. Rev. 843, 898-99 (1999).
7. See Louis Henkin, "Nationality" at the Turn of the Century, in Recht zwischen
Umbruch und Bewahrung: Vrlkerrecht, Europarecht, Staatsrecht 89 passim (Ulrich
Beyerlin at al. eds., 1995) (discussing the evolution of national identity and its effect
on international politics).
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sovereignty in relation to the "nationality" even of corporations, and
state authority and jurisdiction over them.
That much has been agreed, and was agreed upon in the early part
of the century, and it is what professors of international law and
politics have long taught. But something happened to that "S word"
in the twentieth century. I address what one might call
"transformative" developments.
The first, perhaps the most important, came after two world wars,
after the sacrifice of several human generations and millions and
millions of human lives. After the defeat of Hitler, sovereignty began
to mean "let's leave each other alone-no war, no use of force." That
was the law that was established in the United Nations Charter and at
Nuremberg.' War became illegal, 9 then nuclear weapons made world
war unthinkable, and world war was in fact kept "cold" for thirty
years. We may not appreciate how remarkable that was, that
transformative development in the middle of the twentieth century:
"sovereign states" gave up their "sovereign" right to go to war.
Another development, less dramatic, also followed the end of the
Second World 10War. At mid-century, states had to learn to pursue
"cooperation."' Cooperation by "sovereign" states did not come
easily, and it continues to be difficult. I blame the delusions and
mythology of sovereignty for the failure of states to collaborate more
extensively. Sovereignty does not encourage cooperation; it breeds
"going it alone."
We have had some cooperation, but it has been limited in the name
of sovereignty. We pursued a quest for world order, but a limited
world order. We created a United Nations, but it is a limited United
Nations. " We have a World Bank and an International Monetary
Fund and other specialized agencies, and they are all limited by the
concept of sovereignty. They are limited, not only in achievement but
even in aspiration, by a persistent addiction to this notion of
sovereignty.
The international human rights movement is a third transformation.
Until 1945, sovereignty, political independence and territorial
8.See U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 1-4; Principles of International Law Recognized
in the Charter and Judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Report of the
International Law Comm., U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc.
A/1316 (1950) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles].
9. See U.N. Charter arts. 1, 2, paras. 4, 33; Nuremberg Principles, supra note 8,
Principle VI(a).
10. See U.N. Charter preamble; Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, preamble, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome];
North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (establishing the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)).
11. See U.N. Charter art. 10 (providing the General Assembly the power to make

nonbinding recommendations); id. art. 27, para. 3 (requiring an affirmative vote of
nine members of the Security Council, as well as unanimous consent of the permanent
members, before a binding resolution may be issued).
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impermeability meant that how a state treated its own inhabitants was
not a subject of international concern.12 How a state treated its own
inhabitants was nobody else's business.
That was Hitler. The world stood by, and had nothing to say about
it. International law said nothing about it. What went on behind
territorial frontiers was cloaked by an iron curtain of sovereignty.
The international human rights movement, born during the Second
World War, has represented a significant erosion of state sovereignty.
And it took Hitler and the Holocaust to achieve that. Since 1945, how
a state treats its own citizens, how it behaves even in its own territory,
has no longer been its own business; it has become a matter of
international
concern, of international politics, and of international
13
law.
I need not say that sovereign states did not rush to embrace
international human rights, to welcome that gaping gap in their
sovereignty. But, slowly, they have accommodated. They have agreed
to human rights treaties. Even big, powerful sovereign states, such as
the U.S.S.R. and China, and the big-power sovereigns of Europe,
France and Great Britain, and the United States, became parties to
human rights treaties. 4 They accepted international human rights
standards, as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,'15 specific, particular international standards 16 to replace their
own once-sovereign standards (or lack of standards). They imposed
international standards on other sovereign states-at Nuremberg, on
Germany; 7 and all the sovereign states had no difficulty flouting the
sovereignty of South Africa when they voted for sanctions against
apartheid.18
So a major rent developed in the cloak of sovereignty, due to this
12. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

13. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027

(1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N.

GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW]; International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660

U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD]; International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International

Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter ICESCR]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention];
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
14. See ICCPR, supra note 13, at 256-301; ICESCR, supra note 13, at 52-106.
15. UDHR, supra note 13.

16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. See Nuremberg Principles, supra note 8.
18. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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idea of human rights. Sovereign states have not done this eagerly, but
some 150 states out of fewer than 200 have adhered to the major
covenants, in which they undertake legal obligations as to how they
will treat their own inhabitants. One hundred and twenty-five states
have adhered to the Genocide Convention. 9 One hundred ninetynearly every state except the United States of America-have
adhered to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.2 One hundred
fifteen are party to the Convention Against Torture;, 1 160 to the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,"s and 160 to
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
WomenY3
I do not wish to paint a rosy human rights picture-or, if you prefer,
to paint a dark picture of the condition of state sovereignty. The
banner of sovereignty still waves ominously over all human rights
issues; the mantra of sovereignty is still intoned against human rights.
Sovereign states accept international human rights standards, if they
wish to, when they wish to, to the extent they wish to. They submit to
monitoring, to judgment by international human rights courts and
commissions, if they wish, to the extent they wish.
And so, state sovereignty at the end of the twentieth century-and
at the beginning of the twenty-first-can be summarized as:
"Sovereignty means 'leave us alone.'" Sovereignty is: "We will
engage in a minimal amount of cooperation, if we as sovereign states
consent." Sovereignty is subject to some "creeping" international
human rights, to the extent sovereign nations consent. In general, I
fear sovereignty as we have known it is alive and well.
That would have been my conclusion if asked to speak five years
ago. Now, however, as we face a nev century, a new millennium, one
hears that "S word" again. We hear it invoked, proclaimed, protested,
perhaps protested too much-as if the concept is under siege. I have
noted three contexts in which we hear the cry of sovereignty, cries of
joy or of anguish, but surely of confusion.
The first is "globalization"-a new word, a new development, a new
phenomenon, that has become almost a buzzword. State socialism is
gone, and state capitalism, too, is giving way to privatization! 4 A
global economy is largely replacing and overwhelming national and
regional economies.25 Companies created in one country are
19. See Genocide Convention, supra note 13.
20. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, reprinted at 28
I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
21. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 13.
22. See ICERD, supra note 13.
23. See CEDAW, supra note 13.
24. See Wolfgang Freiherr Von Marschall, Creatingthe Necessary Instntments for
a Market Economy in the Post-Conmmnist Countries of Eastern Europe. Policiesand
Problems,39 St. Louis U. L.J. 951, 951 (1995).
25. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-OrientedPerspective
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headquartered in another with branches and subsidiaries, or mines
and factories, in third or fourth or fifth or more countries. 6
Multinational companies are swallowing up national companies, and
finding themselves subject to the confusion and inefficiency of
competing sovereignties.2 7
What is globalization doing, or what has it done, to that concept of
sovereignty, the oldest idea in international relations? Giant
companies have become largely independent of states, of the states
that created them, of the states in which they operate. Some of them
are replacing, or at least jostling, the states themselves in the state
system. So we have the phenomenon of globalization and everybody
thinks it is doing something to sovereignty (I think it is, too, although
I'm not sure exactly what).
The "international market" is a related concept. We read and hear
about "the Market." Where is the Market? Where is it physically or
geographically? Under whose laws and under whose control? Who is
sovereign in regard to the Market, or perhaps is the Market
sovereign?
There are other terms, or concepts, out there, some of which I don't
understand.
Cyberspace-where is cyberspace? Is it subject to state
sovereignty?
To the same state sovereignty?
Is cyberspace
sovereign?
And perhaps a different, earlier "globalization," slowly recognized,
still barely attended to, is "the environment."2
Where is the
environment?
Is it sovereign? Is it subject to some state's
sovereignty, or perhaps to the sovereignty of several states, or to the
sovereignty of all states?
In theory, in very theoretical theory, every state can try to subject
these global phenomena, or some pieces of them, to its sovereign
jurisdiction. In theory, in theoretical theory at least, sovereign states
can get together and agree to laws and create institutions. But no
sovereign state, and not all state sovereignties together, seem to be
sovereign enough to solve the problems that these developments have
brought to our human society at the end of the twentieth century.
There is growing, though grudging, realization that world economic
on the PublicdPrivateDistinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l
L. 769, 815 (1998); Eleanor M. Fox, Vision of Europe: Lessons for the World, 18
Fordham Int'l L.J. 379, 385 (1994).
26. See Lan Cao, Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning?, 32 Tex.
Int'l L.J.545,558 (1997) (book review).
27. See Paul B. Stephan, III et al., International Business and Economics: Law and
Policy 302 (1993).
28. See, e.g., Neil A. F. Popovic, In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights:
Commentary on the Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the
Environment, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 487, 487-96 (1996) (describing the
international recognition of the importance of global environmental issues).
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affairs, world communications, and inevitably, therefore, world
politics, are no longer cabined within the state system. And suddenly,
or perhaps slowly, the realization is sinking in that sovereignty has lost
its nerve, and sovereign states have realized that they are losing their
control, that the state system is losing control.
I would devote a few minutes to ponder the effects of globalization
in all of its forms in relation to the other phenomenon of our time, the
law and politics of the international human rights movement.
The contemporary human rights movement, I have suggested,
represents a significant deviation from pre-Second World War
conceptions of sovereignty. In fact, some have seen sovereignty as
threatened by the very idea and ideology of human rights, by the
whole of what we call international human rights, by the ever-growing
body of covenants and conventions and international and regional
institutions. And, as some see it, sovereignty is also threatened by
busybody
governments
and
busybody
nongovernmental
organizations-Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the
Lawyers Committee-and by professors, by litigious lawyers who are
after Karadzic and Pinochet, and some day perhaps Milosevic, and
many still anonymous in many parts of the world.
Sovereignty continues to raise its head against monitoring, against
the efforts to shame governments, efforts by their own citizens, by
other governments, by international bodies, by nongovernmental
organizations, by the media, and by professors.
Now, if state sovereignty has resisted the human rights movement,
and if globalization has begun to threaten state sovereignty, that may
sound promising for the human rights movement. But I do not find
comfort for human rights in the various forms of globalization. The
fact is that human rights and the human rights movement depend on
governments and on the state system. With a nod--or, if you will, a
thumb of the nose-to the shade of Karl Marx, I do not see the
withering away of the state as a result of globalization. If Marx's
ideology did not end the state, and with it the state system, neither will
globalization in its various forms, singly or together. In any event, if
the state is going to wither away, the time has not come, and will not
come soon.
Rather, for those who care about human rights, the need is to work
to make the state system more human rights-friendly, even in the age
of globalization, even taking globalization into account. Human rights
advocates must learn to use the state system against threats posed by
various forms of globalization (in addition to those presented by
governmental abuses). I do not consider globalization to be beyond
or outside the state system. Some sovereign states singly, several of
them together, or all of them together through international
institutions, can bend the globals to their will, and they can do so for
human rights purposes. Globalization does not relieve states of
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responsibility for the human rights of people subject to their
jurisdiction. The state is required to ensure those human rights which
it is able to protect. It cannot encourage or condone violations. It
cannot encourage or condone violations even by globals, if it can
regulate or control them.
Those of us who work these two fields, globalization and human
rights, have to rethink what we taught for fifty years, and persuade
others that our rethinking is necessary, desirable, and good.
For example, sovereignty used to mean that only states-not
individuals, not companies-were subject to international law and to
national laws purporting to implement international obligations. But
if globalization is changing that, if we no longer say, as we have for
almost fifty years now, that only states are subject to international law,
we may be able to create a new set of "responsibles," of "persons"
responsible for human rights violations under international law. It is
not only the states that are responsible. When giant-tentacled
companies become substitutes for governments, can they perhaps be
held responsible for human rights violations? The obligations of
states to respect and to ensure rights need to be cast so as to include
the activities and violations, of global companies wherever and
whoever, they are.
International law and national law can, and do, address human
rights violations or complicity in violations by multi-faceted
companies in far-flung places, including big companies with big
names. If they are charged with complicity in human rights
violations-for example, child labor-they can be sued, as they are
now in U.S. courts, 29 as once only government officials could be. They
can be targeted in Nigeria and Burma," as once they were in South
Africa. 31 The IL0 32 has awakened from a reasonably deep slumber.
NGOs, 33 shareholders, consumers, the media, and the academy are
joining forces against human rights violations by the globals.
The market too, sovereign or not, is open to regulation by
governments, by a few governments singly, by several who cooperate,
29. See Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non
Conveniens on U.S. Human Rights Litigation,39 Va. J. Int'l L. 41, 55-56 (1998).

30. See id. at 56.
31. See, e.g., Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5111

(1988) (imposing prohibitions against a broad scope of economic relations with South
African business and government agencies, to be lifted upon "substantial progress"
toward eliminating apartheid); Security Council Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess.,

2046th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (1977) (imposing mandatory sanctions against
South Africa, constituting the first mandatory sanctions against a U.N. member state);
Julie Fairchild Grey, Note, The Passage of the Federal Anti-Apartheid Act: The
Culmination of Anti-Apartheid Efforts Within the United States, 11 Suffolk Transnat'l
L. Rev. 387, 409-413 (1987) (discussing the development of United States foreign
policy toward South Africa).
32. International Labor Organization.
33. Non-Governmental Organizations.
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and by those who cooperate institutionally through IFIs, international
financial institutions.
Cyberspace also impinges on human rights. It is not sovereign,
whatever that means, but it relies upon physical, legal, and political
points of contact in one or more states, and depends on the consent of
its participants; all are subject to state law and the state system. The
environment, of course, also comes into every sovereign state, and
some states, many of them, can regulate it if they are willing.
Our job, therefore, as academics, as citizens, as actors in the human
rights movement, is to take the human rights idea of fifty years ago
and apply it to a globalized world. We cannot take for granted that
the answers are obvious or easy; we certainly should not take negative
answers.
And then "et cetera." It is a useful basket in which to put other
issues related to sovereignty. Some of them are unhappy examples.
Who is sovereign in a "failed state?"' A distinct sovereignty does
not exist in these, for example in Liberia a few years ago. Some states
are failed even though they may be members of the UN.
Who is sovereign when the state is helpless against local terrorists,
or against suicide bombers?
Who is sovereign, or what can
sovereignty do, against ethnic conflict within or across state borders,
against civil war, whether it spills over into other territories? And
how sovereign is a state if it cannot prevent genocide? And then,
there are other kinds of terrible things: what can sovereignty do for
(or against) floods of refugees or internally displaced people?
If the state system is losing control, if it is exploding, is state
sovereignty perhaps also imploding? If a government no longer has
control within a state's territorial boundaries, who does? Can there
be a sovereign state with nobody in control? If what happens inside a
state's territory is no longer subject to effective internal control, who
is in charge? Who in the state system is responsible for genocide
within the former Yugoslavia? Who is responsible for ethnic
cleansing, for crimes against humanity, for war crimes, for internal
wars, and for terrorism, whether internal, transnational, or
international?
Or-helplessly-who
is responsible
for the devastating
consequences of natural disasters-floods, hurricanes, and
earthquakes that have devastated economies and blighted hopes for
economic and social development, and economic and social rights for
hundreds of millions of people seeking human dignity? Who is
responsible for the recurrent problem of terrorism, transnational or
34. In a failed state, "the central authority in a country has collapsed and there no
longer exists a functioning government to maintain order." Charles W. Kegley, Jr. et
al., The Rise and Fall of the Nonintervention Norm: Some Correlatesand Potential
Consequences,22 Fletcher F. World Aff., Winter-Spring 1998, at 81, 89.
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international, or for drug smuggling and people smuggling, and
various other forms of international crime, or for internal crimes
which states cannot or will not address, or may even promote or
condone?
"Et cetera" also provides an opportunity to look generally at the
responsibility of sovereign states and of their citizens in the state
system at the end of our century. This sub-sub-sub heading includes
the problem of external intervention. Until recently, the state system,
the system of sovereign states, was committed to territorial integrity,
which excluded all forms of external intervention, even for noble
purposes. 5 It meant that even international law generally did not
apply and international bodies had no authority
within some state's
3' 6
territory. We called it "domestic jurisdiction.
Therefore, international law and international bodies could not
intervene in internal wars; they could not intervene to address
atrocities, even genocide, inside a state's territory. We have made a
little progress in bringing the laws of international war to internal
wars, but it came hard and it is hardly complete. And we have had to
learn, slowly, to address various forms of humanitarian interventionthat is, intervention for humanitarian purposes, but intervention
under law. Unilateral humanitarian intervention at the will or whim
of some state is too dangerous to contemplate. Group interventionNATO 37-has raised its own objections, and it does not work very
well. It depends on volunteers, and volunteers are few and reluctant.
In Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the system recognized that internal
hostilities and gross human rights violations-apartheid or genocide
or other crimes against humanity-create threats to international
peace and security.38 There has not been too much objection to the

Security Council asserting that it has a right to intervene in such
35. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
36. See John P. Humphrey, The InternationalLaw of Human Rights in the Middle

Twentieth Century, in The Present State of International Law and Other Essays
(International Law Association 1973) 75, 75 (describing the traditional view that
human rights fell "within domestic jurisdiction and hence beyond the reach of

international law").
37. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

38. In the aftermath of human rights violations in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia, the United Nations established international criminal tribunals to identify
and punish the perpetrators of the atrocities. See Security Council Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing an

international tribunal for human rights abuses in Rwanda); Security Council Res. 827,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (implementing an
international human rights tribunal for the former Yugoslavia). Whereas resolutions
of the U.N. General Assembly are not binding upon U.N. members, the U.N. Charter
obligates members to obey Security Council Resolutions. See U.N. Charter art. 25.
The Security Council is authorized only to issue a binding resolution to combat a

threat to international peace and security. See id. art. 39. In order to mandate
international action against human rights violations, the Security Council must first
find that the violations threaten peace and security across national boundaries.
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internal matters on the theory that they present threats to
international peace and security.3 9
The U.N. Security Council, however, is not a perfect body. It is
hampered by the veto.' It is embarrassed by its slanted membership,
dominated by the big powers. 4' It does not have troops at its disposal;
it depends on voluntary contributions of armies and monies, not
always forthcoming, or sometimes forthcoming only from
unacceptable sources on unacceptable terms.
So we have a problem. If sovereignty has imploded sufficiently, so
that the human community feels responsible for what goes on inside
territories, we have to find ways of addressing problems occurring in
other states, ways that are legally, morally, and politically acceptable.
There are ways. Sovereign states may have to extend their own
jurisdiction to matters that are internal in other states. We may have
to extend the reach of the international mantle inside states. We may
have to persuade states to attend to what their companies do, for
which the state has jurisdiction, whether based on nationality or some
other link. We may have at least to assert "universal jurisdiction," the
premise that all states have jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity.42
Bemoaning the disappearance or erosion of sovereignty, or asking
where it is, are not productive approaches to these problems.
Solutions require the attention and cooperation by all who are
affected by them, and today that still means governance by those who
have jurisdiction and law-making authority, not only under their own
national systems but also under international law.
If the global community and the market are not easily ruled by any
one state, and if we consider controlling them important, one or more
states can govern them, and several can combine to do that more
effectively, whether for the cause of human rights or otherwise. When
sovereign states are helpless or unwilling, we need international
bodies, such as the tribunals in Yugoslavia or Rwanda, such as the
proposed International Criminal Court, happening around us.n
Finally, "et cetera" leads me to reopen a quixotic campaign to try to
decompose the concept of sovereignty. Gradually, I would stop using
the word. I use the word only to stop using it.
More important than the word, I would abandon some of its
questionable assumptions and its undesirable accretions. I would
identify the elements that have legitimate claims and the values which
each of those elements is supposed to serve. Consider state
39. See U.N. Charter art. 24.
40. See id art.27,para.3.
41. See id art. 23, para. 1.
42. See U.N. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17,
1998, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 18319, art. 7 (defining crimes against humanity).
43. See id. art. 1 (establishing the International Criminal Court).
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autonomy; it is comparable to the autonomy of individuals within
societies. But the autonomy of states is not intrinsically a human
value, though it has important indirect consequences for human
values.
Consider the parallel, individual autonomy. When in the course of
human events we began to talk about the rights of man, we
emphasized that "all men are created equal,"' and that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, among them
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.45 States can also be said to
have rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But, Mr.
Jefferson went on to say, "to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men."' That is the point. The sovereignty of the
individual in the state of nature did not prevent a social contract, and
it would not have survived if we did not have a social contract. The
international system of states also needs a social contract. Sovereignty
should not mean anarchy. It should not mean refusal by states to be
governed. Because sovereignty and sovereign states are sometimes,
often, ineffectual, some seek to build new international institutions,
new institutions of governance, but states continue to set up
sovereignty as an argument for frustrating their efforts.
We need to back, to shore up, the international systems we have
created. There are many ratifications of human rights agreements,
but with many sovereign reservations, and those who are concerned to
do something about them have not yet seriously begun to resist
reservations. We have not begun the struggle to withdraw existing
reservations-for example, to the Convention on Women,47 or even to
the ICCPRL-reservations imposed in the name of sovereignty (and
sometimes a special kind of sovereignty, religion, which is a subject for
another lecture).
In sum, sovereignty should not mean isolationism. It should not
mean resistance to cooperation. It should not mean indifference to, or
forfeiture of responsibility for, what happens elsewhere. It should not
mean refusal to assume obligations. It should not mean failure to
comply with obligations we have assumed. Sovereign states, one has
to remind governments, can adhere to human rights treaties, and they
can do so without reservations. And they can cancel reservations they
have entered.
And the easy ones: sovereignty means territorial impermeability,
but it does not immunize genocide and it does not immunize rape
from external communal concern, judgment, and intervention.
Above all, we have to avoid the temptations of traditional
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
See id.
Id.
See CEDAW, supra note 13.
See ICCPR, supra note 13.
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sovereignty. The autonomy-the "privacy" of states-is an important
value, but not as an iron curtain. We cannot insist that what we do at
home is no one else's business, even if we do it in the name of religion
or in the name of some other value. A decent respect for the opinions
of mankind, you will remember, was our undertaking from our
nation's birth,49 and we have to honor that as part of our sovereignty.
Sovereignty as a right to do as one pleases is part of the concept, but
not sovereignty as anarchy, not sovereignty as resistance to
cooperation. And not sovereignty as immunity. The most common
use of the word "sovereignty" may be in sovereign immunityimmunity from law, immunity from scrutiny, immunity from justice.
General Pinochet gets no votes from me.
What shall we do about the "S word?" I have tipped my hand. We
need to address what has happened to traditional notions of
sovereignty as a result of forces we have identified, and others,
globalization, the market, and cyberspace.
But, to sum up, if the state system has lost control, single states still
have jurisdiction over pieces of that global activity which can be
localized in its territory or with which it has links of nationality and of
money-and some states have quite a lot of links of nationality and
money. States, for example the United States, have power in their law
and power in fact to ensure that companies respect human rights,
companies with which they are affiliated, and that these companies do
not themselves, or in complicity with others, including foreign
governments, violate human rights.-'
What single states cannot themselves control, they can control by
cooperation-as to the market, cyberspace, and the environment. If
globalization has given private entities power to impinge on human
rights, states can still exercise their sovereign power to induce
compliance with the international obligation of the state to ensure, as
well as to respect, human rights.
If states do not act, sovereign companies can be induced by
shaming,51 by NGOs, the responsible press, by stockholders, by
consumers, by codes more or less voluntary, codes of the kind that we
learned to use in connection with South Africa.3
But I do not want to leave the impression that it is easy.
Globalization, in its various components or aspects, bespeaks the
helplessness of human institutions. Sometimes the framework in
49. See U.S. Const. amend. I; The Declaration

of Independence passim (U.S.

1776).
50. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
51. See Taylor, supra note 4, at 807.
52. Non-Governmental Organizations.
53. See supra note 31 (describing mandatory codes); G.A. Res. 41/35F, 41 U.N.

GAOR Supp. No. 53, at 28, U.N. Doc. A141/53 (1987) (implementing a voluntary
code).
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which we have learned to see problems and pursue solutions, the
framework of sovereignty and sovereign states, does not help us even
see where to begin.
So I offer no magic formula, no guarantee of success in vindicating
human values. But we would do better than we are doing, if we saw in
the tatters of our sovereignty not obstacles, not as pretext for
indifference, for isolationism, but responsibility and opportunities to
secure human values.

